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ABSTRACT
The growth of unsolicited commercial e-mail (UCE) imposes increasing costs on organizations
and causes considerable aggravation on the part of e-mail recipients. A thriving anti-spam
industry addresses some of the frustration. Regulation and various economic and technical
means are in the works. All anti-spam measures aim at bringing down the flood of unwanted
commercial e-mail.
This paper contributes to the understanding of the UCE phenomenon by drawing on scholarly
work in areas of marketing and resource ownership and use. Adapting the tragedy of the
commons concept to e-mail, we identify a causal structure that drives the direct e-marketing
industry. Computer simulations indicate that although filtering may be an effective method to curb
UCE arriving at individual inboxes, it is likely to increase the aggregate volume, thereby boosting
overall costs.
We also examine other response mechanisms, including self-regulation,
government regulation, and market mechanisms. We find that, of the various countermeasures,
filtering appears to be the best currently available but that none are a satisfactory solution. The
analysis advances understanding of the digital commons, the economics of UCE, and provides
practical implications for the direct e-marketing industry.
Keywords: unwanted commercial email (UCE), SPAM, email marketing, markets for attention,
information overload, tragedy of the commons, system dynamics, simulation
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer-mediated communication is one of the accepted channels in the mix of outlets that
modern companies rely on to advertise and sell their products (Figure 1). Electronic mail (e-mail)
advertising generated nearly a billion dollars in revenue in 2001 and is predicted to reach several
billion dollars within a few years [Martin et al., 2003]. Reputable commercial establishments, such
as J.C. Penney, Barnes and Noble, and Borders use e-mail for communicating with customers
[Martin et al., 2003]. The marketing industry’s search for an optimal portfolio of online and
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traditional advertising [Kover, 1999; Sheehan and Doherty, 2001] is expected eventually to evolve
into integrated marketing communication programs [Brackett and Carr, 2001].
A cleverly designed direct marketing campaign contributes to overall sales [Chiang et al., 2003].
E-mail is more attractive than regular mail due to its lower distribution cost, wider reach,
convenience, and faster responses [Mehta and Sivadas, 1995; Sheehan and McMillan, 1999;
Martin et al., 2003]. The cost of sending e-mail is $5 to $7 per one thousand messages, while it
is $500 to $700 for the same volume of regular mail – two orders of magnitude greater [Martin et
al., 2003]. Moreover, digital marketing campaigns are easier to customize, which can produce
better response rates than mail campaigns [Ansari and Mela, 2003]. Timing is also an issue. It
takes, for example, 5 to 10 days to receive a response to e-mail surveys, versus 10 to 15 days to
postal surveys [Sheehan and McMillan, 1999]. By including hyperlinks, e-mail allows a degree of
interactivity not afforded by conventional direct mail campaigns [Martin et al., 2003].

Cinema
Internet
Radio
Outdoor and Transport

1%
2.20%
3.40%
5.20%

Direct Mail
TV

14.30%
25.30%

Press

48.60%

Adapted from [DMIS, 2004]

Figure 1: Shares of Total Marketing Expenditure in 2003 by Channel:
The UK Case.

DRAWBACKS OF DIRECT E-MARKETING
Despite the many benefits to senders of direct e-marketing campaigns, the impacts are
pernicious on consumers, e-mail providers, and organizations. Many users are angry and
frustrated because they must sift through mountains of unsolicited commercial e-mail (UCE) in
their inboxes. E-mail administrators struggle to maintain high service quality in the face of
increasing server loads, storage requirements, and security threats. Of the roughly 31 billion daily
e-mails sent globally, about 12.4 billion (41 percent) are considered UCE [Spam Filter Review,
2005] – MSN alone blocks 2.4 billion per day [Unspam, 2005]. The average e-mail user receives
4.5 adult content e-mails per day, 16 percent of users change their e-mail address because of
UCE saturation, and 4.5 seconds of corporate time is wasted per spam message [Halverson.Org,
2005]. With some users receiving hundreds of UCE messages per day [Halverson.Org, 2005], it
is no wonder that frustration is growing. OECD (the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
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Development) examined the costs of UCE, finding that in June 2004, the annual spam cost per
employee exceeded $1900 and the annual lost productivity per employee equaled 3.1 percent
[Anonymous, 2004]. Corporations are burdened by the financial and intangible costs of spam,
and managers struggle to find solutions to UCE [Corbitt, 2004]. They fear that the situation is
likely to become more grave in the future [Fallows, 2003].
II. THE QUEST FOR EYEBALLS: ATTENTION AS A SCARCE RESOURCE
Over thirty years ago, Nobel laureate Herbert Simon [1971] observed that attention is a scarce
resource in an information-rich society. In the parlance of modern theory, the attention of workers
can be viewed as a strategic asset that determines the long-term success of an organization
[Davenport and Beck, 2001]. When more information arrives than individuals can process, an
information overload [Simon, 1971] occurs, and the likelihood of organizational failure increases.
“The design principle that attention is scarce and must be preserved is very
different from a principle of “the more information the better.” Simon[1971, p. 44])
Examples of information overload are abundant. Perlow [1999], for example, describes a software
company characterized by an environment in which employees were not able to dedicate
adequate attention to their primary tasks. The company suffered from chronic project time
overruns. Sometimes the results of information overload are tragic. Recent reports describe the
FBI’s inability to process hours of sensitive communication believed to be of high intelligence
value [Lichtblau, 2004].
The attention squeeze and information overload are exacerbated by the onslaught of UCE,
whether viewed from an individual, organizational, or macro level. At an individual level, spam is
increasing at a great rate for some e-mail users1. At an organizational level, spam as a
percentage of e-mail is substantial [Melville et al., 2004]. On an aggregate level, industry reports
suggest a steady upward trend for UCE volume. Brightmail, for example, estimates that spam as
a percentage of total e-mail grew by approximately a third from 49 percent in June 2003 to 65
percent in June 2004. More somber news is that spam is moving beyond e-mail to other
platforms, including instant messaging (spim), blogs, and mobile text messaging. Given these
trends and the limited time an individual can spend on dealing with e-mail, the e-mail recipient is
bound to experience information overload.
We now extend the concept of attention as a limited resource to the concept of the digital
commons (Section III) and to the review of several mitigation mechanisms (Section IV). We then
construct a causal model of the UCE industry and use the model to analyze one popular
abatement mechanism: filtering (Section V). The last section summarizes results and outlines
extensions.
III. TRAGEDY OF THE DIGITAL COMMONS
Rapidly increasing spam volume is a result of decisions made by many self-interested agents
involved in digital marketing. These participants vie for one common resource: the attention of email recipients. A typical outcome for a situation in which many profit-seeking agents compete for
the same scarce resource is resource overuse. The suboptimal outcome is often described as
“the tragedy of the commons”2 [Hardin, 1968]. A vivid example is overexploitation of fish stock in
the ocean. In an online world in which many resources are still open to all:
Management of the digital commons is perhaps the most critical issue of market
design that our society faces [McFadden, 2001].

1

For examples see graphs at http://www.raingod.com/angus/Computing/Internet/Spam/Statistics/
The term comes from the old English custom of providing a common lawn, called a commons, in the center
of a village on which shepherds could graze their sheep.
2
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THE PHYSICAL COMMONS
A common resource is typically identified as one with the following properties:
1. it is rival, that is, when it is used, less is available for others; and
2. it is nonexclusive, that is, no one can be barred from using it.
Individuals seek disproportionate private gains through the use of the resource but do not bear
the full cost. The oceans, forests, grazing lands, the atmosphere, outer space, and highways are
all susceptible to problems of the commons. History is replete with examples of resource
degradation by rational, self-interested individuals such as grazing land for sheep, fish in oceans,
and oil reserves.
THE DIGITAL COMMONS
The commons problem, however, is not limited to the physical world. Members of early Usenet
discussion groups in the 1980s faced analogous circumstances: the groups were open to
everyone and a small set of users could degrade the environment for all. In this context, the
pollution sprang from various sources – excessive posting or posts that were off topic, offensive,
or contained advertising – and lowered the value for all. The notion of virtual commons was thus
applied to an online common resource whose misuse by the few degraded the value of the
resource for the many [Kollock and Smith, 1996].
To formalize the application of commons logic to the Internet, two conditions are necessary
[Regan, 2002].
1. The Web must be a place, just as the earth is a place. The Internet is commonly and
consistently recognized as a place for conducting a wide array of economic and social activity.
Everyday metaphors provide evidence in this regard, with terms such as “going online,” “size of
the internet,” “internet storm,” “virtual community,” and “virus” illustrating the mapping of the
physical to the virtual. The place metaphor is also a fundamental concept used in Internet law:
the cyberspace as place metaphor operates as one of the most compelling
theories of how we have regulated cyberspace to date, and how we are likely to
regulate it in the future [Hunter, 2003, pp. 446].
2. An online commons must contain resources (analogous to fish stock in oceans) characterized
by sharing, the lack of clearly defined private ownership, overuse, and negative externalities. A
common resource is shared by many and private ownership is unclear or non-existent, just as no
one owns the depths of the oceans and the fish stock in it. Many Internet resources involve
sharing, including public discussion groups, peer-to-peer file sharing networks, and e-mail. No
one can be barred from using these areas of cyberspace. The presence of overuse by rational
individuals leads to pollution that affects all. In this context, e-mail is a common good [Regan,
2002].
Spam exhibits signs of a negative externality, which results in production that is higher than
society desires. This assertion is evidenced by the bombardment of e-mail addresses with spam
and the resulting financial and non-pecuniary costs borne by each of the millions of users, their
respective e-mail administrators, and employers. Table 1 draws parallels between UCE and fish
population, which is a canonical common resource suffering from the tragedy of the commons. As
the online commons is not a biological system, we take care in drawing the analogy
homomorphically, i.e., by “paying attention to the peculiarities of the digital environment as well”
[Greco and Floridi, 2004].
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Table 1. Comparison of a Physical and Online Commons
Fisheries

UCE

Common Resource

Fish stock in oceans

Attention of e-mail users

Self-interested behavior

Fish as much as possible

Send as much UCE as possible

Technique

Fishing expeditions

Marketing campaigns

Tragedy

Over fishing

Information overload

IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE DIGITAL COMMONS TRAGEDY
Analysis of property rights, privacy, externalities, regulation, and incentives in the context of
common resources such as forests and grazing lands
brings a wide variety of perspectives and research methodologies to bear on the problem. Here,
we briefly review three broadly defined corrective approaches to the tragedy of the commons:
1. self-regulation through community norms;
2. government control and regulation; and
3. price and market mechanisms.
SELF-REGULATION
Even though societal norms sometimes prevent the tragedy of the commons from occurring (e.g.,
[Lessig, 2001, p. 22, note 9]), it is unlikely that such self-regulation will work in the case of spam.
In theory, the Coase theorem (e.g. [Mankiw, 2001]) predicts that parties which are locked in a
situation with negative externalities may negotiate their way out of the problem if property rights
are clear and transaction costs are small. Inboxes, of course, have clearly defined property rights.
Senders’ identity, however, is misrepresented in about 70 percent of spam messages [Fallows,
2003: 13]. Moreover, locating the source of spam is not trivial. It took Earthlink a year and a team
of 12 professionals to track only one spammer [Black, 2003]. Hence, the Coase theorem breaks
down on this ground alone. Revamping the e-mail protocol to make it more difficult to hide one’s
identity [Fallows, 2003] may resolve the spammer identification problem. But even then, the
transaction cost of reaching a settlement between millions of e-mail users and spammers is likely
to be excessively high for self-regulation to work.
GOVERNMENT REGULATION
The second mechanism is government regulation. In the United States, for example, UCE led to
anti-spam legislation, notably, the 2004 CAN-SPAM Act. Legislative activity is likely to increase
[Fallows, 2003]. Given the cultural dimensions of spam, regulatory responses vary by country
[Gratton, 2004]. The approach of the European Union is to ban spam outright, with steep fines for
violators. In contrast, the U.S. allows spam, provided several constraints are met, including
consistency between message subject and message content and indication in the subject line
that the message is advertising. Regardless of the specific approach, enforceability remains an
issue because the Internet is borderless and it is easy to locate e-mail servers in countries
friendly to spam.
The debate about the effectiveness of the anti-spam laws is heated [Ray and Schmitt, 2003;
Sipior et al., 2004]. Some even suggested that anti-spam laws will result in an increase in spam
[Squillante, 2003]. The European Commission acknowledged in a recent report that spam cannot
be stopped by regulation alone [Swartz, 2004b]. In the U.S., the CAN-SPAM Act does not appear
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to be working and the volume of spam is still growing [Swartz, 2004b]. One estimate claims that
at most 3 percent of spam follows the CAN-SPAM rules [MX Logic, 2004]. Undoubtedly, recent
lawsuits by major U.S.-based e-mail providers using the U.S. CAN-SPAM act will set important
precedents.
MARKET MECHANISMS
Market mechanisms for controlling spam are still in the developing stages. One popular idea is
the introduction of electronic stamps [Leyden, 2004]. Fixed e-postage is not unlike the Pigovian
tax [Mankiw, 2001], a classical regulatory mechanism by which governments charge a fixed fee
for each unit of pollution. Even though lab experiments [Kraut et al., 2002] and basic economic
theory suggest that postage is likely to reduce UCE volume, the theory of the Pigovian tax
suggests that the mechanism may miss the optimal spam production point. If the postage amount
is not set correctly, then there might be either underproduction or overproduction of UCE. The
U.S. government also attempted to address the problem of environment degradation by creating
a market for tradable pollution permits [Mankiw, 2001]. This policy is often considered superior to
a Pigovian tax. An idea similar to tradable pollution permits but for the realm of electronic
marketing was proposed by Fahlman [2002].
Several other market mechanisms are under discussion such as attention bonds [Van Alstyne et
al 2004]. However, because of their early-stage development, it is difficult to know which, if any,
may achieve success.
V. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF FILTERING
Having outlined the digital commons problem and described several mitigation mechanisms, we
now describe our simulation model that enables analysis of UCE dynamics and the assessment
of the most popular UCE mitigation mechanism: filtering. The model was implemented using
system dynamics as the modeling methodology. A comprehensive reference on system dynamics
is Sterman [2000]3.
Conventional commons problems such as over fishing have been modeled as dynamic systems
(e.g. FishBanks interactive computer simulation4). The system consists of at least two agents
whose quests for private gain reinforce one another until curtailed by limits in the environment. In
the case of fishing, each agent maximizes revenue or profit until the system is overrun and fish
stocks become depleted. Our approach is to adapt this model to the case of the online commons,
specifically, UCE. To the best of our knowledge, this approach to studying spam is unique and it
allows leveraging what we already know about physical commons to the problems of online
commons.
The UCE value chain includes four participants:
1.

inbox owners

2.

harvesters

3.

operators

4.

sponsors.

The inbox population is the set of feasible recipients of unwanted
commercial e-mail.
Harvesters are in the business of discovering inboxes and compiling them
into lists of e-mail addresses, which they sell to UCE operators.
UCE operators administer spam campaigns, which promote products from
sponsors.
Sponsors support campaigns based on their success rate.

3

A quick introduction to system dynamics by Craig Kirkwood can be found at
http://www.public.asu.edu/~kirkwood/sysdyn/SDIntro/SDIntro.htm. Additional resources can also be found
on the official website of the International System Dynamics Society: http://www.albany.edu/cpr/sds/.

4

http://www.unh.edu/ipssr/Lab/FishBank.html
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We now explain the dynamic processes relating these four value chain participants illustrated in
Figure 2.
ADDRESS HARVESTING
To receive UCE, an inbox address must be discovered by a harvester. Inbox addresses can be
collected in hundreds of ways [Brain, 2004]. One of them is via directory harvest attacks (DHA), in
which automated programs query e-mail servers for the existence of millions of commonly
designated usernames5. The Center for Democracy and Technology [2003] reports that
harvesters are also effective at gathering e-mail addresses posted on the web6. Considering the
many ways in which harvesters add e-mail addresses to their lists, it is reasonable to assume that
it is only a matter of time before an e-mail account is discovered (Figure 27). We model harvesting
by including an average inbox discovery delay. Delays, including the discovery delay, are shown
in Figure 2 as two short lines crossing an arrow.
ATTENTION AND INFORMATION OVERLOAD
The attention resource can be measured in terms of time [Simon, 1971]. A survey conducted by
the American Management Association found that an employee typically spends about a quarter
of her day on e-mail [Swartz, 2004b]. Employees possess a limited attention resource. The total
demand for attention from regular and UCE e-mail is proportional to their respective volumes
delivered to inboxes. Assuming that regular e-mail has a higher priority than spam, the time left
for UCE is the difference between the attention resource and the attention devoted to regular email (Figure 2). If the arriving volume of electronic messages is greater than what an individual is
comfortable handling, then, using Herbert Simon’s terminology, information overload occurs.
RESPONSE RATE
Advertisers know about the negative relationship between advertising volume that an individual is
exposed to and the response rate to advertisements [Rudolph, 1947; Starch, 1966; Houston and
Scott, 1984]. Houston and Scott [1984], for example, statistically showed a negative convex
relationship between advertising readership and the number of pages in a journal. Recent
research shows that the negative relationship holds equally well for electronic marketing. Martin
et al. [2003] found that in the case of permission-based advertising for a company operating from
Finland, the likelihood of visiting a link advertised within an e-mail decreased as volume of e-mail
from the company increased. A survey by the Pew Internet & American Life Project [Rainie and
Fallows, 2004] found a decline in the readership of UCE while the UCE volume increased.
Anecdotal evidence from UCE operators [Hansell, 2003] also confirms the existence of a negative
relationship between the amount of spam that a finite group receives and the response rate. This
phenomenon is indicated by the loop in Figure 2 comprising UCE volume – attention required by
UCE – information overload – response rate.

5

See http://www.postini.com/services/what_are_dhas.html
An example of a clearly illegal harvesting technique is the AOL employee arrested for stealing the e-mail
addresses of 92 million AOL users [Swartz, 2004a]. The employee sold the list to an operator of an online
gambling business in Las Vegas for $100,000. That person in turn repackaged and resold the addresses to
spammers for over a million dollars.
7
Figure 2, is a schematic of our system dynamics model.
6
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Figure 2: The Causal Structure of the UCE System
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PROFITABILITY
For a given overall response rate, the total number of responses a company receives increases
with its share in the e-mail volume (in Figure 2, this result is captured by positive links between
UCE Volume from Operator and Responses to UCE from Operator). More responses imply more
revenue (Figure 2). More revenue means more profit. Greater profit implies that with some delay
(shown as two short lines crossing an arrow in Figure 2) more budget is allocated for UCE by a
sponsor and thus expenditure on UCE volume increases. The UCE volume that a sponsor can
buy for a given expenditure is inversely proportional to the UCE price that an operator charges for
sending electronic messages.
It is clear from Figure 2 that UCE volume tends to increase while profits from UCE campaigns
increase. This concept is captured by two positive Sponsor Profit Loops. Starting new campaigns
is easy and quick thanks to specialized software packages [Lemke, 2003]. An example of such a
tool is iBuilder from VerticalResponse8. Hence, campaigns involve low marginal cost, and
therefore cost recovery is unimportant [Kraut et al., 2002]. A campaign requires an extremely low
response rate to break even: 0.001 percent is often sufficient [Fallows, 2003: 26]. The causality
acting through the response rate forms the Attention Limit Loop (Figure 2), which checks the
exponential growth of spam.
RESULTS: BASE CASE
We conducted computer simulations for a fictitious organization with 10,000 inboxes. The
organization could be, for example, a company with employees or an e-mail provider hosting email accounts. We allow only a small portion of the accounts to be initially known to spammers.
However, due to address harvesting (Section V), the number of discovered accounts increases
over time . In the model, we assume that UCE budget is proportional to the profitability of UCE
campaigns; that is, the more profitable the UCE, the greater budget will be allocated for emarketing. Table 2 summarizes the assumptions of the model. Parameter values were suggested
by published surveys and anecdotal evidence from experts.
Table 2. Model Assumptions
Item

Implementation

Source

Organization size
Initial population of discovered
inboxes
Time spent on e-mail by an
employee
Average regular e-mail volume
Base price of sending 1,000 UCE
messages

10000 inboxes

Assumption

10 Inboxes

Assumption

2 Hours/day

[Swartz, 2004b]

20 Messages/day

Assumption

$5 per 1000 messages

[Martin et al., 2003]

A declining function of UCE
volume
Allocated proportionally to the
past profit from the UCE
campaign

See Response Rate section
above

Response rate
E-mail marketing budget

Assumption

Figure 3 shows the base run for the simulated 2 years of life of our fictitious organization. Inbox
discovery is proportional to the number of remaining undiscovered inboxes, and therefore the
number of discovered inboxes grows monotonically and asymptotically toward the total inbox
population (Figure 3a). Within two years, more than 80% of the inboxes are discovered. Positive
profits accrued through spam campaigns (Figure 3b) encourage sponsors to allocate even more
8

http://www.verticalresponse.com/
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resources for electronic marketing (Figure 3c and Figure 2). Greater UCE budgets allow each
sponsor to spend more on e-mail (sponsor’s expenditure in Figure 2), which contributes to the
growth of the UCE volume from operator A and B (Figure 2). Hence, global UCE volume grows
as well (Figure 3d and Figure 2). The UCE volume that arrives to an individual inbox also grows
exponentially (Figure 3e), which is consistent with real life examples (see Footnote 1).

400,000

300,000

200,000

100,000

a. Inboxes
0
0

73

146

219

292

365

438

511

584

657

730

511

584

657

730

Time (Day)

a. inboxes

b. Profit

800,000

800,000

600,000

600,000

400,000

400,000
200,000

200,000
0
0

73

146

219

292

365

438

511

584

657

730

0
0

Time (Day)

73

146

219

292

365

438

Time (Day)

d. UCE Volume

c. UCE Budget
100

75

Figure 3. UCE System Simulated for 2 Years
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RESULTS: THE IMPACT OF SPAM FILTERING
When foreseeing an approaching information overload, Simon suggested filtering as a possible
solution [Simon, 1971]. Filtering of unsolicited e-mail is capable of reducing demand for attention.
Users report a lesser burden of spam at work than on their personal e-mail accounts because of
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active e-mail screening at work [Fallows, 2003]. The popularity of this solution feeds the growth of
a new and active anti-spam software industry. The method, however, is flawed. Many inbox
users fear that aggressive filtering may lead to some legitimate e-mail being discarded. The Pew
Internet Project [Fallows, 2003: 29] found that about one third of the respondents feared their
incoming e-mail might be blocked, and 13 percent were convinced that it happened to them.
About a quarter of respondents feared that their outgoing e-mails might be filtered out by the
intended recipient.
In this subsection we study the effect of filtering on UCE volume using the computer model
introduced in Figure 2. We assume that the organization starts filtering e-mail in the third year.
To address fears that legitimate e-mail may be discarded, the organization discards only UCEsuspects that it is most confident about. In other words, only some percentage of the UCE
volume that arrives to the organization is delivered to recipients and the rest is filtered out. In
reality, the portion of UCE messages which gets through the filter changes daily9. However, this
model is concerned with the overall effect of filtering, rather than with daily variations in the
positive identifications by a filtering algorithm. Therefore, the model assumes that every day the
filter recognizes some fixed fraction of the incoming UCE volume as spam, which is consequently
discarded.
Figure 4 shows a simulation that extends the run in Figure 3 for 5 more years (2555 days total).
The figure compares the case when filtering is used to the case when no filtering is implemented.
Under each scenario, during the seven-year period, harvesters discover all inboxes (Figure 4 a).
Figures 4b through 4e show the case when the organization performs no active filtering with
dotted lines. As in the base case simulation discussed earlier, driven by the two Sponsor Profit
Loops (Figure 2), each operator continues to increase UCE that leads to the growth in global
volume of unsolicited messages (Figure 4b), which in turn contributes to the increase in spam
arriving to individual accounts (Figure 4c). Eventually, attention required by UCE outgrows
attention available for UCE and information overload becomes more strongly felt (Figure 2)10. Email recipients, who are overwhelmed by increasing volumes of spam (Figure 4c), tend to delete
most of it, thus driving the overall response rate down (Figure 2 and the ‘no filtering’ case in
Figure 4d). The declining response rate leads to lower revenue and lower profit (use Figure 2 to
trace the logic and Figure 4e for the resulting profit trajectory). With some delay, the declining rate
leads to lower revenue and lower profit (use Figure 2 to trace the logic and Figure 4e for the
resulting profit trajectory). With some delay, the declining financial performance of the electronic
marketing campaigns affects the sponsors’ UCE budgets (Figure 2). As a result, the UCE volume
tapers off (later portions of Figure 4b).

9

For a detailed account of the filtering procedures followed by a typical medium-sized organization, see
Melville et al. [2004].

10

According to the systems dynamics methodology (Footnote 3) dominant loops drive the dynamics of a
system. Thus, positive Profit Loops drive the system initially, resulting in exponential growth of UCE volume.
When the growth starts slowing down (as seen in Figure 4), it means that some balancing force becomes
stronger in the system. In other words, the balancing loop Attention Limit gains force. Eventually, the
Attention Limit loop becomes dominant and slows down the growth of UCE. Attention overload is the reason
for the Attention Limit loop. Although Figure 2 does not show which loop is dominant at every moment, once
loops are identified in Figure 2 we can draw conclusions, based on the system trajectories, which loops are
influencing system’s behavior.
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e. Sponsor’s Profit

EFFECT OF FILTERING
The effect of filtering is clearly visible starting in year three. Filtering reduces the burden from
UCE on an individual by lowering UCE volume arriving at an individual inbox (solid line in Figure
4c). Feeling less overwhelmed by incoming spam, we assume that readers tend to read a greater
fraction of incoming messages, thus increasing the overall response rate (solid line in Figure 4d).
Better response rates drive profitability upwards (solid line in Figure 4e), which in turn, as shown
in Figure 2, encourages greater UCE budgets, thus allowing sponsors to spend more on e-mail
marketing. Greater expenditure by each sponsor boosts overall UCE volume (filtered case in
Figure 4b). Hence, while lowering the burden of spam on individuals (Figure 4c), filtering is likely
to increase overall volume of UCE (Figure 4b).
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VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper we addressed the growing problem of unsolicited commercial e-mail (UCE).
Adopting the viewpoint that in an information-rich society attention is a limited resource [Simon,
1971] allowed us to describe the problem of spam in terms of a common resource. The common
resource framework is well understood in economic literature and is helpful in explaining many
phenomena that lead to the overexploitation of limited resources. The situation of overexploitation
of a resource by self-interested agents is generally referred to as the tragedy of the commons.
The framework was applied to other Internet-related problems (e.g.,[ McFadden, 2001; Kollock
and Smith, 1996; Regan, 2002; Hunter, 2003]). When applied to the virtual world, the
phenomenon is dubbed the tragedy of the digital commons.
We reviewed several solutions to the spam problem: self-regulation, government regulation,
market mechanisms, and filtering. We concluded that based on theoretical and empirical
evidence self-regulation is unlikely to resolve the problem. Recent attempts at government
regulation failed to lower the spam volume. In view of the commons theory and its applications to
the cases when traditional resources are overused, market mechanisms appear to be quite
promising; but they are still in their early development stages. Finally, we offered a simulation
analysis of filtering, which is currently the most popular option to combat UCE.
Filtering was offered as a possible solution to information overload long before e-mail became
popular [Simon, 1971]. Filtering, however, may impose costs that exceed the benefit [Cranor and
Lamacchia, 1998]. The benefit is the reduction of spam volume arriving to an individual inbox.
However, as our discussion in Section V showed, the use of filtering is likely to stimulate
production of spam. Greater spam volume consumes more of an organizations’ bandwidth and
processing resources [Melville et al., 2004]. Furthermore, organizations and spam senders
iteratively improve their filtering and electronic marketing tools, respectively, with no clear end to,
or winner of, such an arms race. The continuous anti-spam effort is costly. Inbox owners bear the
cost too because false positives during spam filtering lead to the deletion of desired e-mail. From
a theoretical standpoint, this loss reduces consumer surplus [Loder et al., 2004]. Table 3
summarizes benefits and drawbacks of the filtering solution.
Table 3. Benefit and Drawbacks of the Filtering Solution
Benefit
Lower UCE volume to an inbox
Drawbacks
Greater global volume of UCE
Emergence of the costly “anti-spam arms race”
False-positives lower consumer surplus

The evidence and analysis in this paper indicate that currently available anti-spam options will not
be effective in the long term at containing the spam pandemic. Hence, the search for more potent
methods of abating the spam crisis and frustrating the unchecked onslaught of the electronic
marketing industry must continue. In Section I, we pointed out that the direct marketing industry,
which is legitimate, is affected by UCE. In Sidebar 1 we offer suggestions to the direct marketing
industry on how to cope with UCE.
In our future work, we plan to apply the theoretical framework and the computer model developed
in this paper to the in-depth analysis of government regulation and market mechanisms as
solutions to the spam problem.
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SIDEBAR 1. DIRECT MARKETING
To compete effectively with UCE for customer attention, the legitimate direct marketing industry will need to:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

foster relationships with customers
be sensitive to the optimal emailing frequency
limit email to customers who consented to receiving such communication
target and customize email, so as to make email communication useful to the recipient
use email as only one dimension in a comprehensive marketing campaign
actively distinguish itself from UCE
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APPENDIX I. MODEL EQUATIONS
This appendix presents the model equations. Note that the described Profitability is for sponsor A
and operator A. Equations for the profit loop formed by sponsor B and operator B are identical
and differ from A only in terms of subscripts.
Address Harvesting
Average time to discovery
Undiscovered inboxes
Discovered inboxes
Total inboxes
Fraction of inboxes discovered
Attention and Information Overload
Time an employee can spend on email
Attention resource of an organization
Discovered attention resource
Time it takes to read an email
Regular email volume to discovered inboxes
Attention devoted to regular mail
Attention available for UCE
UCE volume
Attention required by UCE
Information overload
Response Rate
Maximum response rate
Response rate
f (O )

Profitability
Sponsor A’s profit
Budget duration
Average daily profit
Sponsor A’s expenditure
Price of UCE
UCE volume from operator A
Responses to UCE from operator A
Average revenue per sale
Sponsor A’s revenue
Marketing fraction
Adjustment of spam budget
Sponsor A’s UCE budget

td
Iu

( d / dt ) I d

= I u / td

I = Iu + I d
i = Id / I
T
A =T ⋅I
Ad = i ⋅ A
e
Er

Ar = e ⋅ Er
AUCE = Ad − Ar
EUCE = E A + EB
D = e ⋅ EUCE
O = D / AUCE
rmax

r = rmax ⋅ f ( O )

0 ≤ f (O ) ≤ 1

f ' (O ) < 0

π = M A − CA
τ
( d / dt ) π = (π − π ) / τ
C A = BA / τ
p
EA = CA / p
RA = r ⋅ E A
m
M A = m ⋅ RA
a
B+ = a ⋅ π

( d / dt ) BA = B+ − C A
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